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Abstract—Information theoretic secrecy is combined with cryp-
tographic secrecy to create a secret-key exchange protocol for
wireless networks. A network of transmitters, which already have
cryptographically secured channels between them, cooperate to
exchange a secret key with a new receiver at a random location,
in the presence of passive eavesdroppers at unknown locations.
Two spatial point processes: homogeneous Poisson process and
independent uniformly distributed points are used for the spatial
distributions of transmitters and eavesdroppers. We analyse
the impact of the number of cooperating transmitters and the
number of eavesdroppers on the area fraction where secure
communication is possible. Upper bounds on the probability of
existence of positive secrecy between the cooperating transmitters
and the receiver are derived. The closeness of the upper bounds
to the real value is then estimated by means of numerical
simulations. Simulations also indicate that a deterministic spatial
distribution for the transmitters e.g. hexagonal and square
lattices, increases the probability of existence of positive secrecy
capacity compared to the random spatial distributions. For the
same number of friendly nodes, cooperative transmitting provides
a dramatically larger secrecy region than cooperative jamming
and cooperative relaying.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic secrecy has attracted a significant
interest in recent years due to its possible applications in
wireless communications, and the growing significance of
wireless networks. Wyner [1] first introduced the concept of
wiretap channel in 1975. For discrete memoryless channels, he
has determined that a message can be transmitted reliably from
a transmitter to a receiver without revealing any information on
the message to the eavesdropper provided that the transmitter
operates at rates smaller than the secrecy capacity. If the main
channel and the wiretap channel are additive white Gaussian
noise channels, then the secrecy capacity is equal to the
difference of the capacities of the two channels as shown by
Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman in [2]. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[3] extended the previous results to the case of a broadcast
channel with confidential messages.
Secrecy capacity can be improved using cooperation with
friendly nodes. In the cooperative jamming [4], friendly nodes,
which are close to the eavesdropper, jam the eavesdropper to
help increase the achievable secrecy rates for the transmitter by
decreasing the signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio at the eavesdropper.
In the cooperative relaying [5], [6], friendly nodes which are
closer to the receiver than to the eavesdropper are used as
relays. The relays increase SNR more at the receiver than at
the eavesdroppers.
Information theory achieves perfect secrecy as opposed
to the computational secrecy provided by cryptographic al-
gorithms. Here we examine the possibility for mutual ap-
plications of cryptographic secrecy and information-theoretic
secrecy. A set of transmitters (e.g. base stations) have al-
ready cryptographically secured the communication channels
between them. When a transmitter wants to communicate
securely with a new receiver (e.g. a mobile station), a pre-
secret key message is created by the transmitter, broken into
several data blocks, and a separate block is encrypted and
sent to each of the other transmitters. Then each transmitter
sends its data block to the receiver. The transmitters ensure
that all the data blocks are received correctly at the receiving
node, which is required for the computation of the secret
key at the receiver. The secret key is securely and cooper-
atively transmitted to the receiver (without being divulged
to the eavesdroppers) if the secrecy capacity is positive for
the communication channel between at least one transmitter
and the receiver. As the number of transmitters grows, the
eavesdroppers are facing a more difficult task of being able to
intercept a larger number of transmitters. Once the secret key
is exchanged, the legitimate parties can start communicating at
the maximum data rate since their communication channel is
cryptographically protected achieving computational secrecy
[7].
Here is the overview of this paper. In Section II we present
the system model. In Section III we address the main research
questions of this paper: (i) evaluation of the impact of the
spatial distribution of transmitters and eavesdroppers on the
secrecy region fraction, and derivation of upper bounds for
this fraction; and (ii) comparison with cooperative relaying
and cooperative jamming. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. NETWORK MODEL
We consider two-dimensional wireless networks with the
following communication nodes: A network of LT cooperating
transmitters, a single receiver, and a network of LE passive
eavesdroppers. The passive eavesdroppers do not transmit any
signal, and try to intercept the information that is transmitted
between the pairs of legitimate nodes, hence reducing the
secrecy capability of the network. Their locations are unknown
to the transmitters. Each transmitter is equipped with only a
single omni-directional antenna.
In the sequel, we use the following notation:
L(A) The area of a region A ∈ R2;
LT A random variable which denotes the number of
transmitters in a region A;
LE A random variable which denotes the number of
eavesdroppers in a region A;
b||c A concatenation of two data blocks b and c;
V, Ve The additive noise at receiver and eavesdropper,
which are independent zero mean Gaussian random
variables with variance σ2;
Ct,r Capacity of the communication channel between
transmitter t and receiver r;
Cs:t,r Secrecy capacity between transmitter t and receiver
r;
Cs Secrecy capacity between a set of cooperating trans-
mitters and a receiver;
dj,i The distance between nodes i and j.
We use the additive white Gaussian noise model. Then, the
received signal at the receiver r from the transmitter t is
Y = d
−β/2
t,r X + V.
where X is the transmitted signal from the transmitter t, and
β is the path-loss coefficient [8]. The received signal at the
eavesdropper e from the transmitter t equals
Ze = d
−β/2
t,e X + Ve.
The point to point capacities between transmitter t and
receiver r, and between transmitter t and eavesdropper e are
given by [2]
Ct,r =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
Ptd
−β
t,r
σ2
)
Ct,e =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
Ptd
−β
t,e
σ2
)
(1)
where Pt is the transmitter’s power. If the point to point
capacity between the transmitter and the eavesdropper Ct,e
is larger than the capacity of the channel between the two
communicating nodes Ct,r, then Cs:t,r = 0. Otherwise,
Cs:t,r > 0 [2]:
Cs:t,r = max{Ct,r − Ct,e, 0}
From Eq. (1) it follows that Cs:t,r > 0 if the receiver r is
closer to the transmitter than the eavesdropper, that is, dt,r <
dt,e. The disk Ds ⊂ R2 with center at the transmitter and
radius equal to the distance between the transmitter and the
nearest eavesdropper is called secrecy disk of the transmitter. If
a receiver is inside the secrecy disk, then the secrecy capacity
between the transmitter and the receiver is positive.
Receivers which are outside the secrecy disk for a given
transmitter can not communicate securely with that transmitter.
In the next section we explain a type of cooperation for a set of
friendly transmitter that combines their secrecy disks and thus
allows them to communicate secretly with receivers positioned
in a larger region.
III. COOPERATIVE TRANSMITTING
The set of transmitters have already established a cryp-
tographic secret key, and they can cryptographically protect
their mutual communication channels. Let assume that trans-
mitter ti and a new communicating node/receiver r want
to communicate. ti generates a pre-secret key message B
with arbitrary length, which it then divides into LT blocks
b1, b2, . . . , bLT . Each block is sent to a a different transmitter
via a cryptographically secured channel. Then each transmitter
ti sends its block bi to the receiver. The intended receiver
correctly receives all blocks b1, b2, . . . , bLT , and restores the
pre-secret key message B = b1||b2|| . . . ||bLT . Both ti and r
use a cryptographic hash function H to calculate the mutual
secret key K = H(B), which is then used to cryptographically
protect their mutual communication. The eavesdroppers have
to be able to intercept the transmission from all LT transmit-
ters. If at least one data block out of LT data blocks is not
intercepted, then the secret key K can not be computed at the
eavesdropper. We call this strategy for cooperation - coopera-
tive transmitting. Using cooperative transmitting a transmitter
can exchange a secret key with a receiver if the receiver is
inside any of the secrecy disks for all LT transmitters. The
impact of cooperative transmitting is quantitatively measured
through the fraction Fs(A) of a region A covered by the union
of secrecy disks. In other words, fraction Fs(A) is equal to the
probability of securely exchanging a secret-key with a receiver
that is randomly positioned inside the region A
Fs(A) ≡ P{Cs > 0}
. The coverage problem by secrecy disks was studied by Sarkar
and Haenggi [9]. They studied the covered volume fraction and
the asymptotic conditions for complete coverage in one and
two dimensions.
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of cooperative transmitting
on a sample network. Receiver r is inside the secrecy disk of
transmitter t4, and therefore block b4 can not be intercepted
by any of the eavesdroppers.
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Fig. 1. Sample network with four transmitters, one new receiver, and three
eavesdroppers.
In the remainder of this paper, we analyse the dependence
of P{Cs > 0} on the spatial distributions of transmitters
and eavesdroppers. We analyse both random and deterministic
models for the spatial distribution of transmitters and eaves-
droppers. Two simple models for random spatial processes
for the transmitters and the eavesdroppers will be used. The
first model is homogeneous Poisson process on the plane
characterised by the mean number of points λ in a unit area,
called also rate or density of the Poisson Process. The number
of points l inside a region A follows the Poisson probability
distribution law with parameter λL(A)
PL(l) =
(λL(A))l
l!
e−λL(A) (2)
In the second model a fixed number of points are indepen-
dently and uniformly distributed (IUD) in a certain region of
the plane, characterised by s single parameter - the fixed num-
ber of points. These models are widely used in the literature on
information theoretic secrecy [9], [10], [11], the reason being
twofold. They provide a good first-order approximation for the
spatial distribution of communication nodes in real networks.
Second, simplicity of the homogeneous Poisson process and
IUD process allows for an analytical analysis of information
security-related metrics e.g. fraction Fs(A). For the spatial
distribution of the transmitters we will also investigate two
deterministic models: hexagonal lattice and square lattice.
A. IUD transmitters and IUD eavesdroppers
In the first case, the position of the transmitters in a region
A ∈ R2 obeys a IUD process with parameter nT . Similarly, a
fixed number of eavesdroppers nE are positioned according to
an IUD process in the same region A. If nT = 1, then Cs > 0
if the receiver is inside the secrecy disk of the transmitter,
that is, it is closer to the transmitter than any of the nE
eavesdroppers:
P{Cs > 0} =
1
1 + nE
(3)
For nT > 1, we establish an upper bound for P{Cs > 0} as
follows. For nT = 2, the secrecy region of the two transmitters
is union of their secrecy disks:
P{Cs > 0} = 1−P{Cs < 0} ≤
1−P{Cs:1,r < 0}P{Cs:2,r < 0} ≤ 1−
(
nE
1 + nE
)2
where the overlapping area of the two secrecy disks is ne-
glected in the upper bound. One can generalise for nT > 1
thus obtaining
P{Cs > 0} ≤ 1−
(
nE
1 + nE
)nT
(4)
Next we consider the case when both nT and nE grow
infinitely, while their ratio remains constant k = nTnE . This is
a good first order approximation when the area of region A
grows infinitely and the densities of transmitters and eaves-
droppers remain constant. Then
lim
nE→∞
P{Cs > 0} ≤ lim
nE→∞
1−
(
nE
1 + nE
)knE
= 1− e−k
(5)
In order to evaluate the closeness of the upper bounds (4)
and (5) to the real value, we have numerically estimated the
value for P{Cs > 0}. Figure 2 depicts the dependence of
P{Cs > 0} on nT and nE as obtained from the numerical
simulations. Each point on the curves is obtained from 100,000
network simulations.
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Fig. 2. Dependence of P{Cs > 0} on the number of transmitters nT with
nE as the curves’ parameter. The lowest curve corresponds to nE = 10, and
the highest curve is for nE = 1.
Figure 3 shows the closeness between upper bound given by
Eq. (4) and the real values for P{Cs > 0}, which are estimated
through numerical simulations. Relative gap between the upper
bound and the real values grows for larger nT due to the
increasing number of overlapping secrecy disks.
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Fig. 3. Closeness between the real value for P{Cs > 0} (circles) and the
upper bound (squares) given by Eq. (4).
Figure 4 shows the closeness between the upper bounds (4)
and (5), and the numerically estimated values for P{Cs > 0}.
Relative gap between the upper bounds and the real values
gets smaller for smaller k (larger nE) since the secrecy disks
as well as their overlaps become smaller in size.
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Fig. 4. Closeness between the real value for P{Cs > 0} (circles), and the
upper bounds given by Eqs. (4) (squares) and (5) (triangles). nT = 10 and
nE = 1, 2, . . . , 10.
B. Poisson transmitters and IUD eavesdroppers
Next we consider the case where transmitters are positioned
according to a Poisson spatial process with rate λT . Without
lose of generality of the results, we assume that L(A) = 1
and thus the average number of transmitters in the region A
is λL(A) = λ. Eavesdroppers’ positions obey an IUD process
and the number of eavesdroppers in the region A is nE .
If the number of transmitters LT is 1, then Eq. (3) holds.
For LT > 1, the upper bound given by Eq. (4) is valid. Then
an upper bound for P{Cs > 0} can be derived as an average
value of functions (3) and (4) for the random variable LT :
P{Cs > 0} = E [P{Cs > 0|LT }]
≤
1
1 + nE
λT e
−λT +
∞∑
lT=2
(
1−
(
nE
1 + nE
)lT) λlTT
lT !
e−λT
= 1− e
−λT
1+nE (6)
Figure 5 shows the closeness between the upper bound
(6), and the numerically calculated values for P{Cs > 0}.
Similar to Fig. 3, accuracy of the upper bound decreases
for larger λT as a consequence of the increasing number of
intersecting secrecy disks. Numerical simulation of a Poisson
spatial process was done according to [12]. In order to generate
a Poisson process with rate λ in a region A, we first randomly
select a value l for a Poisson variable with mean λL(A),
and then we randomly position l IUD points in A. Observed
dependence of P{Cs > 0} on λT and nE was similar to the
one depicted in Fig 2.
C. IUD transmitters and Poisson eavesdroppers
A fixed number of transmitters nT are positioned at IUD
points in a region A ∈ R2. Positions of eavesdroppers follow
a Poisson spatial process with average rate λE . For sake of
simplicity we again assume that l(A) = 1 Then the number
of eavesdroppers in A is a Poisson random variable LE with
average value λE . Its probability distribution function is given
by Eq. (2) where λ = λE . For nT = 1, the secrecy region
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Fig. 5. Closeness between the real value for P{Cs > 0}, and the upper
bound given by Eq. (6).
fraction is given by
P{Cs > 0} = E
[
1
1 + LE
]
=
1
λE
(1 − e−λE )
For nT > 1 we ran numerical simulations, and the results
are given in Fig. 6. Note the similarity with Fig. 2.
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Fig. 6. Dependence of P{Cs > 0} on the number of transmitters nT with
λE as the curves’ parameter. The lowest curve corresponds to λE = 10, and
the highest curve is for λE = 1.
For sake of completeness, we have also numerically anal-
ysed the case when a homogeneous Poisson process in a
region A ∈ R2 is assumed for both transmitters and eaves-
droppers. Again we have obtained very similar results to the
previously analysed three combinations of IUD and Poisson
spatial processes for transmitters and eavesdroppers. Following
slight differences were observed. IUD spatial process for the
transmitters gives slightly higher values for P{Cs > 0} than
the Poisson spatial processes. On the contrary, the Poisson
spatial process for the eavesdroppers gives slightly higher
values for P{Cs > 0} than the IUD spatial processes.
D. Transmitters in deterministic lattice and UID eavesdrop-
pers
Next we analysed the case when the transmitters are po-
sitioned on a deterministic lattice, and the eavesdroppers
obey a UID process. By means of numerical simulations we
examined a square lattice and a hexagonal lattice. We observed
similar shapes to the curves shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 6 for
stochastic spatial processes for the transmitters. P{Cs > 0}
is higher for a deterministic lattice compared to a stochastic
spatial processes for the transmitters (see Fig. 7) due to the
lower variations in the overlap between the secrecy disks
of individual transmitters. For a stochastic spatial process,
there are areas which can be covered by multiple overlapping
secrecy disks of nearby transmitters. At the same time in the
regions with sparse transmitters, it is more probable to find
subregions not covered by any secrecy disk.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of stochastic and deterministic positioning of eavesdrop-
pers. Top two curves are for hexagonal and square lattice (IUD eavesdroppers
with nE = 5), while middle four curves are for Poisson and IUD spatial
processes for the transmitters’ and eavesdroppers’ positions (with λE = 5 or
nE = 5). Bottom three curves are for cooperative jamming and cooperative
relaying.
E. Comparison with cooperative jamming and cooperative
relaying
In this section we compare cooperative transmitting with
two other strategies for cooperation in wireless networks.
Cooperative relaying and cooperative jamming increase the
secrecy capacity by means of widening the gap between the
SNR at the legitimate receiver and the SNR at the eaves-
droppers. In the single hop cooperation with the best relay
[13], [14] only the strongest relay is selected from the set
of UID randomly positioned relays, which is the relay node
which most improves the secrecy capacity. In the ”single hop
cooperation with the best jammer” [13], [14] a single node
from the set of friendly nodes is selected to act as a jammer.
Cooperative jamming aims to reduce the SNR at the legitimate
receiver, but at the same time it reduces the SNR even more at
the eavesdroppers. On the contrary, the best relay increases the
secrecy capacity by increasing SNR at the legitimate receiver
more than it increases SNR at the eavesdroppers.
We use the value for P{Cs > 0} as a quantitative
measure of the positive impact of the different strategies
for cooperation. Figure 7 shows that cooperative transmitting
offers dramatic improvement in the secrecy region’s size over
cooperative jamming and cooperative relaying.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work we propose to combine information theoretic
secrecy with cryptographic secrecy to increase the secrecy
region, and provide a novel solution to the key-exchange
problem. Cooperative transmitting can significantly improve
information-theoretic secrecy in wireless networks. The type
of cooperation is quite important for the resulting secrecy
region. For the same number of friendly nodes, cooperative
transmitting provides a larger coverage area than cooperative
jamming and cooperative relaying.
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